In their book The Science of False Memory, Drs. Charles Brainerd and Valerie Reyna offered a number of anecdotes and case studies demonstrating false memory. Among the items they offered was this exchange, taken from an actual court transcript:

Court Officer:  Where’d you guys eat lunch on Saturday?

Witness:  Don’t remember.

Officer:  Really?

Witness:  Just can’t recall.

Officer: Well, I talked to your brother’s wife, and she said that you guys ate a lunch at Burger King.

Witness:  She said that?

Officer:  Yeah.

Witness:  Yup, I remember now. It was Burger King.

Officer:  You certain of that?

Witness:  Absolutely.

The authors added, "The indicated conversation with the brother’s wife, which led this witness to ‘remember’ with absolute certainty that he and his brother ate at Burger King, never occurred."

The witness here changes his or her position during this examination, or cross-examination, after the questioning attorney prods him or her with a prompt. The context of the passage would lead us to believe that because of the lawyer’s authority, the witness remembered something that did not happen. In fact, it could not have happened, because, as the authors stated, the attorney lied about the detail that led to the response of affirmative memory. But in this instance, because the witness states two different positions (the first, I don’t recall being at Burger King on Saturday, the second I distinctly remember eating at Burger King on Saturday), and because we have no context for this exchange, we can’t tell if he recalled eating at BK on Saturday, or whether or not he actually ate there. We do not know, for example, if this was a direct examination or a cross-examination. We don’t know if the witness is a material witness, an innocent bystander, a plaintiff, or the defendant.

We can therefore see his/her response in a number of different ways that have nothing to do with false memory. For example, say the defendant actually was at Burger King when he should have been somewhere else. Maybe his family has him on a strict diet, so getting caught going there would have embarrassed him. Maybe he can see the implications in the question (if he was there at time X, how could he have witnessed event Y?)" Then again, he might have actually been at Burger King that Saturday. He could have just as easily responded affirmatively to the question so as to not implicate his sister-in-law (the falsely attributed source of the information), or make her seem less culpable (if she’s the defendant).

As to what the witness remembers, that could be either accurate or inaccurate. It’s possible he could have gone to BK so often, he forgot which days he was there. In other words, he could have simply been agreeing with the questioner, who seemed to have much more knowledge of the situation than he.

Simply put, this example gives us no indication that the witness’ memory, or experience had changed, although his statement did. We can just as easily see this as a case of double deception. The witness could be lying to either protect (or maybe even implicate) a family member. At worst, we could say that he suffered from memory distortion–he could have eaten at the restaurant on Friday, and remembered that experience believing it occurred Saturday–prompted by the deception of an authority figure.

As Drs. Kenneth Pope, Laura Brown and Nicholas Spanos would infer, this response illustrates not the introduction of a foreign experience into the witness’ head so that it would be incorporated just as if it were any other memory. It represents a "compliance with social demand conditions." Still, Drs. Brainerd and Reyna offer more evidence along these lines in the form of case studies of false confessions:

The investigators then proceeded to Mr. K’s house to interview his wife, who also reported no knowledge of the events complained of by Mrs. L’s son. They did learn, however, that Mr. K was a heavy drinker, who was in a state of moderate intoxication during most evenings, who had been encouraged to seek medical treatment for his drinking problem, and who had been drinking on the previous evening.
.....further investigation revealed that a parent had filed a complaint four years earlier that another woman complained that Mr. K fondled the buttocks of her son. Police asked him to come to the station a second time. After grilling, and noting his alcoholic tendencies, he said ‘Well, I suppose I can’t be 100% sure that it didn’t happen….I was so blotto that maybe I can’t rule it out completely, but I sure don’t think anything like that could happen….Yeah, the boy hadn’t been drinking and I had been, so I suppose his memory of Sunday night would have to be clearer than mine.’

In this case, the police are not planting a memory into Mr. K.. Mr. K. nevertheless confesses to a crime that he didn’t commit, based on his past behavior and his acknowledgment of a drinking problem that causes him to black out. He isn’t "100% sure that it didn’t happen," which is hardly the same as same as saying "I remember it happening," or "I’m sure it didn’t happen." In other words, his compliance to a false allegation sprang from belief. That belief was made more plausible once articulated by an authority figure, namely the investigating detective. Yet, Mr. K. makes it clear that this belief is not a memory, false or otherwise.

Another case offered by Brainerd and Reyna concerns the false confession of a Mr. E., a "slightly retarded" man who accidentally tripped while carrying his infant son. The mishap caused the boy’s death. Police would later prove this forensically, but not before eliciting a false confession from the father:

Mr. E stated in response to the researcher’s questioning that although he was sure that he could not have done such terrible things, some of the events seemed quite real to him, both at the time of the police interrogation and at the time of the forensic interview. This was particularly true of the alleged motive for the crime: being very angry toward his wife for leaving him alone with the infant when he was in a state of sleep deprivation. He further stated that at the time of the interrogation, he thought that the police interviewer’s knowledge of events must be far more accurate than his own memory and that, even now, he would be inclined to believe that some of the acts of brutality happened if it were not for the fact that he knew himself to be incapable of such savagery. 

After his arrest, Brainerd and Reyna note, "As he was taken to his cell, he complained to the attendant that the interviewer had put words into his mouth and that he had not harmed his son, which the attendant duly noted." Again this false confession had nothing to do with false memory, but with social compliance. It’s clear that Mr. E. knows that he did not attack his son. But as the authors conceded, "He further stated that at the time of the interrogation, he thought that the police interviewer’s knowledge of events must be far more accurate than his own memory." So in this case, Mr. E. clearly remembers the event, and forensic evidence proves that his memory was correct. Here, he disregarded his memory in deference to the supposedly superior analysis of an authority figure. Afterwards, he still realized that his memory had not been influenced, as the attendant noted.

Other evidence of disregarding one’s memory in deference to social compliance to a group belief or an authority figure often comes from those championing the FMS diagnosis, and, along with other research that clearly establishes the capacity for memory distortion, this makes up the bulk of evidence on behalf of False Memory Syndrome.